Lebanese Shi'ite Poll Shows Shift

A recent survey of Lebanese Shi'ites has revealed a notable shift in opinion regarding Hezbollah's military assets. The data suggests that a majority within the community now supports transferring the group's weapons to the Lebanese state. This development has drawn significant attention from regional media outlets, including Israel's public broadcaster KAN and the Lebanese website Kataeb.org. The results were released in mid-October, highlighting a potential weakening of the militia's traditional grip on its core demographic.

The poll was conducted in September by Statistics Lebanon. It sampled 800 Lebanese Shi'ites to gauge their views on security and governance. The primary finding is that 66.4% of respondents backed the handover of Hezbollah's weapons to the national government. In contrast, only 29.6% wanted the militia to retain its arsenal. Hezbollah has historically argued that its weapons are essential for defending Lebanon against Israel, but this new data challenges that long-held position.

Kataeb.org, which is linked to the Christian Kataeb Party, provided further insights into the political implications. The site reported that 71.1% of those surveyed believed decisions on war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese state. Only 5.9% said Hezbollah's leadership should play a larger role in shaping the country's future. This preference for centralized state authority marks a departure from the dual-power structure that has characterized Lebanese politics for decades.

Trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces remains high among the surveyed population. Approximately 78.5% of respondents expressed confidence in the army. Furthermore, 51.1% identified the military as the institution best suited to guarantee long-term security. By comparison, only 16.5% selected Hezbollah for that role. These figures suggest that the army is increasingly viewed as the primary security guarantor, a status traditionally claimed by the militia.

Sentiment toward Hezbollah's performance is mixed. About 67.4% of respondents said the group either failed to meet its goals in the war with Israel or achieved only some of them. A significant 42.1% expressed disappointment, anger, or concern about the leadership and the conflict's consequences. Despite this criticism, 59.5% still expressed some level of trust in the organization. This includes 37.1% who reported a great deal of trust. Roi Kais of KAN noted that Hezbollah's social networks and status continue to sustain its strength, provided no other entity fills the political vacuum.

This data contrasts sharply with earlier findings. An analysis for Israel's Institute for National Security Studies cited a May 2026 survey by Lebanon's Information International. That study found that 87.5% of Shi'ite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah, while only 7.9% supported giving up its weapons. More than 90% also opposed ties with Israel. The discrepancy between the two polls raises questions about how specific wording or agenda items may influence public opinion in Lebanon.

Researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni argued that Hezbollah's influence is deeply rooted in social and economic networks, as well as political power and historical marginalization. They noted that intimidation often discourages dissent within the community. To weaken the group, they suggested strengthening the Lebanese army and securing financial support from Western and Gulf states. This would allow the state to replace the services currently provided by Hezbollah.

Local signs of wariness are also emerging. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly opposed opening a branch of the Hezbollah-linked financial institution Al-Qard Al-Hassan in their building. They feared it could become a target in an Israeli strike, as such branches have been hit previously. Meanwhile, Hezbollah announced aid packages of up to $14,000 for eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs whose primary homes were destroyed. Families elsewhere can receive up to $12,000. The group has suffered major leadership losses, including the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. A new war in March 2026 caused heavy destruction in southern villages. Whether discontent leads to political change may depend on the state's ability to offer security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity.